Decoupling Employment by McCormick, Marcia L.






Saint Louis University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.
Recommended Citation
McCormick, Marcia L., Decoupling Employment (May 9, 2012). Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 16, p. 490, 2012.





Marcia L. McCormick∗ 
The protected class approach to employment discrimination has not solved 
the problem of discrimination or of a just distribution of resources. Not 
only do race and sex prejudice continue to exist, but material and 
subjective disadvantage continues to be strongly linked to race and sex. 
While our laws have made social changes, progress on those changes 
stalled in the 1980s. Some might even say that the protected class approach 
to discrimination has actually entrenched inequality more deeply into our 
social fabric.  
 This Article seeks a purpose-driven approach to finding solutions to the 
problems of discrimination, asking why it is that we prohibit 
discrimination and what we hope to accomplish through law. It advocates 
for a focus on some baseline of substantive equity for everyone, separated 
from particular employment relationships, and not contingent on identity. 
Such a shift might take pressure off of our antidiscrimination laws, which 
in turn might allow them and the market to operate to promote more 
equality for historically disadvantaged groups. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The world envisioned by Gene Rodenberry in his Star Trek series, a 
world further developed in subsequent spinoff series, has solved the 
problem of discrimination on Earth. There is no more discrimination on 
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, sexual identity, religion, or even 
planet of origin. There is also no more want. The “replicator” produces 
anything needed at a voice command, and the transporter and faster-
than-light-speed space travel combine to take people “where no one has 
gone before.” While that world is science fiction, the aspirations for that 
world exist in our real world very strongly, and have for a long time.  
It seems that there are two paths to follow to get to that world, or at 
least to get closer to it. One path would be to eliminate discrimination, so 
that resources could be divided much more equally; this, in turn, would 
reduce want significantly. The other path would eliminate scarcity, or 
take care of the physical needs of people so that they would no longer 
need to compete for basic resources. This lack of competition would, 
over time, break down arbitrary barriers. This is because so little would 
be at stake in the outcome of any given human interaction governing 
access to those resources that extraneous, irrelevant matters would not be 
considered as often. We have chosen the first path, with mixed results. 
This Article suggests that we think harder about the second. 
The protected class approach to employment discrimination has not 
solved the problems of discrimination or the uneven distribution of 
resources. Not only do race and sex prejudice continue to exist, but a 
person’s level of well-being continues to be strongly linked to race and 
sex. While our laws have made social changes, those changes stalled in 
the 1980s, and we have made little progress on measures of equality 
since. Some might even say that the protected class approach to 
discrimination has actually entrenched inequality more deeply into our 
social fabric. 
This Article, part of Lewis & Clark Law School’s Business Law Fall 
Forum, The Protected-Class Approach to Antidiscrimination Law: Logic, 
Effects, Reform, seeks a purpose-driven approach to finding solutions to 
the problems of discrimination, asking why it is that we prohibit 
discrimination and what we hope to accomplish through law. Beginning 
with those first principles, as if we were starting with a clean slate, might 
illuminate ways to reform the current system. 
We prohibit employment discrimination for deontological reasons 
and for instrumental reasons. Deontologically, we prohibit 
discrimination because it is wrong, because all human beings are 
fundamentally equal, with equal dignity and deserving of equal rights. 
Instrumentally, we prohibit discrimination because systematically 
disadvantaging a group or limiting access to social goods can create an 
underclass of people whose talents are wasted and who are more likely to 
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engage in social unrest. When disadvantages persist intergenerationally, 
that underclass can become permanent, increasing the likelihood of 
unrest and cementing a loss of talent that would otherwise serve the 
public good. 
Thus, although our laws that prohibit employment discrimination 
speak in terms of formal equality, they also seek to improve substantive 
equality by creating conditions for people to access social goods such as 
jobs. Over time, formal equality should, in theory, allow people to 
develop their individual talents without having disadvantage imposed on 
the basis of their status. This, in turn, will result in greater substantive 
equality among groups. 
But it has not worked. Our focus on protected classes and formal 
equality has instead distracted us from this goal, and has been used to 
justify cementing the effects of prior discrimination onto subsequent 
generations. So what if we removed the substantive piece from the 
equation? We must also provide for greater substantive equality, so that 
workplace discrimination is no longer causing that particular injury or 
responsible for that particular cure. 
We use work as a delivery device for most of our social policies. Work 
is the mechanism by which we seek to distribute social goods in a just 
manner. The employment relationship is so overburdened by all of this 
that the prohibition on employment discrimination because of protected 
class status cannot serve the substantive equality goal. Ultimately, we have 
put private sector employers in the role of gatekeepers to our social safety 
net. And they are simply too powerful and unaccountable to serve in that 
role. 
If we decouple those policies from the employment relationship, we 
might solve two problems: (1) we might get to our goal of substantive 
equality faster; and (2) we might make race, color, national origin, sex, 
or religion less relevant to the need for employment, allowing employee 
choice to create a labor market that could operate to drive out 
discrimination and free up employer resources to allow more risk-taking 
in choosing employees. 
Part II of this Article will show just how much social policy is 
accomplished through the employment relationship. Given that context, 
Part III will identify what the goals of employment discrimination law are 
and what our legal approach currently is, highlighting some of the 
problems with the protected class approach. Part IV will explore which 
social policies and programs can be decoupled from the employment 
relationship. Part V will conclude and discuss how that decoupling might 
affect employment decisions. 
II. SOCIAL POLICY AND WORK 
As I write this Article, the media is in an all-out frenzy about the 
economy in the United States and globally. Congress just went through a 
very messy process to raise the country’s debt limit, Standard & Poor’s 
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reduced the country’s bond rating, and trading on the stock markets is 
extremely volatile.1 A USA Today/Gallup poll conducted on August 2, 
2011, the day after the bill to raise the debt ceiling was passed, showed 
that more people disapproved of the agreement than approved of it, and 
nearly half of those polled thought that the agreement would make the 
economy worse.2 By the end of that week, economic confidence plunged 
to its lowest levels since March 2009, in the depth of recession.3 And the 
worry is that we are about to enter a “double dip” recession.4 
The focus to resolve the economic problems? Jobs. As the President 
said the day after the debt ceiling agreement was reached: 
[W]e have now averted what could have been a disastrous blow to 
the economy. . . . In the meantime, the American people have been 
continuing to worry about the underlying state of the economy, 
about jobs, about their wages, about reduced hours, about fewer 
customers. . . . So I’m meeting with my Cabinet here to make sure 
that, even as they have been throughout these last several weeks, 
they are redoubling their efforts to focus on what matters most to 
the American people, and that is: how are we going to put people 
back to work; how are we going to raise their wages, increase their 
security; how are we going to make sure that they recover fully, as 
families and as communities, from the worst recession we’ve had 
since the Great Depression.5 
The employment relationship is clearly central to our economic policies. 
Drilling down, our economic policy is closely tied to our social 
policies as well, and many aspects of our social policies are carried out 
through the employment relationship. As our economic woes and the 
push for health care reform have demonstrated, our economy and social 
 
1 See STANDARD & POOR’S, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM RATING LOWERED 
TO ‘AA+’ ON POLITICAL RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE 2–4 (2011); 
Ken Sweet, Dow Plunges After S&P Downgrade, CNN MONEY (Aug. 8, 2011, 4:48 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/08/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm; The Debt 
Ceiling: Scheme, Stonewall and Fulminate, ECONOMIST, July 23, 2011, at 65. 
2 Jeffrey M. Jones, More Americans Oppose than Favor Debt Ceiling Agreement, GALLUP 
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148802/Americans-Oppose-Favor-Debt-
Ceiling-Agreement.aspx. 
3 The National Bureau of Economic Research measured the recession as beginning 
in December of 2007, Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/dec2008.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011), 
and ending in June 2009, Business Cycle Dating Committee Meeting Report, NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RES. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html. 
4 24/7 Wall St., 10 Signs a Double-Dip Recession Is Around the Corner, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 1, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/08/10-
signs-a-double-dip-recession-is-around-the-corner/242888/. 
5 Remarks Prior to a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange with Reporters, 2011 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 544, at 1 (Aug. 3, 2011). Later that same day at a Democratic 
National Committee event, the President again focused on the jobs message. Remarks 
at a Democratic National Committee Fundraiser in Chicago, Illinois, 2011 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 545, at 2–4 (Aug. 3, 2011) (making remarks regarding quality of life 
and economic growth, all related to jobs and job losses). 
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welfare system depend upon an effectively functioning system of 
employment. Work is the vehicle through which we distribute money and 
social goods. For example, health care and support during the post-work 
period of retirement are both primarily effectuated through the 
employment relationship. While employers do not have to provide health 
benefits or retirement benefits, many do, and that is the primary means 
by which people obtain health care and save for retirement.6 Moreover, 
our Social Security and Medicare systems are dependent on the 
employment relationship and taxes collected from earned income. 
It is not only health care and retirement that we provide for through 
employment. It is also income insurance, like unemployment insurance 
and disability insurance.7 And more fundamentally, work is the means by 
which people get resources necessary for housing, education, food, and 
other things required for subsistence. We even use employment to 
accomplish the redistributive goal of support for groups in the lowest 
socioeconomic tiers. There is very little direct government payment to 
poor people in this country,8 and in fact, about fifteen years ago we 
reformed the welfare system to promote work as the primary delivery 
device for welfare support.9 In a very real sense, work is our social safety 
net. 
Work is not only a distributional device; it is itself, at least in the 
aggregate, a social good to be distributed. To allow the broadest 
distribution of this social good and the other social goods to which work 
serves as the gateway, we regulate work to enable larger numbers of 
people access to jobs. So we allow workers to bargain collectively for 
things like job security,10 we give incentives to employers to limit the 
number of hours any particular employee can work,11 and we require at 
 
6 See CRAIG COPELAND, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 311, 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_11-20074.pdf; David A. Hyman & Mark 
Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
23, 23–24 (2001) (concerning the provision of health insurance); William J. Wiatrowski, 
Changing Landscape of Employment-Based Retirement Benefits, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar01p1.htm (documenting the 
way people save for retirement and the trends in the types of plans available to 
employees).  
7 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Life and Disability Insurance Benefits, PROGRAM 
PERSPECTIVES, Dec. 2010, at 1–3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives 
/program_perspectives_vol2_issue7.pdf (collecting statistics of disability insurance 
coverage for American employees); Sachin S. Pandya, Retrofitting Unemployment 
Insurance To Cover Temporary Workers, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 907, 907 (1999).  
8 See Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Redistribution and Tax Expenditures: The Earned 
Income Tax Credit, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 689, 689–90 (2011) (noting the “erosion of the 
traditional welfare system” and stating that the federal income tax system is now 
“[t]he primary means of providing cash assistance to lower-income families”). 
9 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, § 824, 110 Stat. 2105, 2323. 
10 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159–161 (2006). 
11 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). 
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least in some cases a minimum wage to ensure a subsistence level amount 
of income.12 We regulate within the employment relationship as well—to 
ensure the health and safety of employees,13 to ensure that they can 
continue working as long as feasible,14 and to ensure that politically less 
powerful groups are not systematically denied access to employment,15 
and, through employment, social goods that come with it.  
So how did we get to this point? Through a combination of 
happenstance and design. The virtue of work has long been part of 
American culture and is at least to some extent an outgrowth of the 
Protestant work ethic, an ethic that many of our first settlers considered 
central to their religious beliefs.16 For example, the virtue in work was 
evident in the welfare-to-work movement, and even continues today, as 
shown by the media coverage of the emotional toll that unemployment 
and underemployment is wreaking on people in the current economic 
crisis.17 This country has also long been seen as the land of opportunity, a 
place to emigrate to, a place where anyone can become rich through 
hard work. 
While that description begins to explain the centrality of work to 
American identity, the use of work to deliver other social goods 
happened, at least originally, less by design. Great economic disruptions 
in U.S. history have caused huge shifts in employment. For example, 
during the Great Depression, our political leaders saw work as central to 
recovery, and much of the legislation making up the New Deal was 
enacted to spread work to more people and to raise wages.18 During 
World War II, amid labor shortages and to prevent war profiteering, the 
federal government imposed strict price controls, which meant that 
 
12 Id. § 206. 
13 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006). 
14 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006); 
see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117 (2006). 
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
16 See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM 
(1905), reprinted in THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 1 (Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells eds. & trans., 2002). 
17 E.g., Michelle Hirsch & Eric Pianin, Mental Toll of Extended Unemployment Looms 
Large, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/mental-
toll-of-extended-usnemployment-looms-large/2011/09/27/gIQAD5Lv9K_story.html; Alix 
Spiegel, Economic Crisis, Unemployment Take Emotional Toll, NPR (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100600029; Long-Term Joblessness 
Takes Emotional, Spiritual Toll on ‘99ers’, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 6, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec10/99ers_08-06.html. 
18 See Alan Brinkley, The New Deal Experiments, in THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN 
LIBERALISM: THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACIES 1, 11, 13 (William H. Chafe ed., 2003) 
(describing the National Industrial Recovery Act and subsequent successful pieces of 
legislation); Greg Hannsgen & Dmitri Papadimitriou, Did the New Deal Prolong or 
Worsen the Great Depression?, CHALLENGE, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 63, 66–67, 72–74. 
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wages were capped and not allowed to increase.19 In order to attract the 
most qualified employees, many employers began offering health 
insurance and pensions as forms of compensation.20 That way, real 
compensation could be higher than the wage controls would allow. The 
rise of unions, which bargained for these kinds of benefits at a time when 
labor was in shorter supply, meant that even non-unionized employers 
had to provide the same kinds of benefits to remain competitive.21 So to 
some extent, we simply got in the habit of using work in this way. 
More recently, we have ramped up the use of work to deliver social 
goods. The welfare reform passed during the Clinton Administration 
focused on moving the poor from receiving direct payments from the 
government to at least partly supporting themselves with work.22 Federal 
policy also shifted to use the income tax system, and the earned income 
tax credit in particular, as the primary method of redistributive assistance 
for the poor.23 Of course to be benefitted by an income tax credit, a 
person must have some income, which generally requires being 
employed. While at one time we engaged in more direct wealth 
redistribution to support at least some of our safety net programs, the 
reductions in the capital gains tax and estate tax24 in the last couple of 
decades has meant that any appreciable wealth redistribution for safety 
net programs has been significantly reduced. We now focus almost 
exclusively on individual income to accomplish the redistribution. And 
although one proposal for the recent reform of health care would have 
removed health insurance from the employment context, the reform 
enacted instead used the employment relationship as a primary means to 
provide health insurance, reinforcing the link between employment and 
health care.25 
 
19 See Marcia Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 279, 280 
(1993); Hyman & Hall, supra note 6, at 25. 
20 Hyman & Hall, supra note 6, at 25. 
21 Id. at 25–26. 
22 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 103, 824, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112–13, 2323 (replacing Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and 
requiring recipients to begin working). 
23 Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 8, at 689–90. 
24 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-16, §§ 501, 511, 646, 115 Stat. 38, 69–70, 85, 144 (reducing the estate tax); Jobs 
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 301, 117 Stat. 
752, 758 (reducing the capital gains tax); Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate 
Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 155 (2009) 
(describing the estate tax as designed to prevent concentrations of wealth and 
describing the temporary repeal of the tax in 2001). 
25 Some employers will have to offer their employees coverage. Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253–54, (2010) 
(imposing tax penalties on employers of at least fifty employees who do not offer 
affordable minimum coverage for employees). Other employers may be eligible to 
receive subsidies to offer their employees coverage. Id. § 1421, 124 Stat. at 237–38. And 
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Despite our efforts to distribute work, and thus social goods, 
equitably, we do not seem to be accomplishing that goal. The U.S. work-
force lacks racial and gender equality under almost any measure: 
employment rates, wages, job integration, and labor force participation.26 
Income and wealth inequality are growing, and they are growing in a 
gendered and racially disparate manner.27 Sex and race segregation in 
the labor market, while less severe than in the days of legal (and even 
legally required) segregation, remain high; men of color and women of 
all colors are concentrated in lower-paying jobs,28 exacerbating the 
income inequality problem. Moreover, the effects of the recent recession 
hit people of color and women harder than it did white men.29 The next 
Part will describe how our laws against employment discrimination were 
supposed to remedy this problem and why they are less effective than we 
might hope. 
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE PROBLEMS WITH 
THE PROTECTED CLASS APPROACH 
Even though work is central to our economic system—or maybe 
because it is—neither legislatures nor courts seem very interested in 
interfering with the employment relationship. The default rule which 
most employers and certainly all labor and employment lawyers are 
familiar with is that employment is at-will, which of course means that the 
employee can be fired “for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at 
all.”30 We simply tinker around the edges of that rule, prohibiting only 
 
finally, the individual mandate will be enforced by a tax penalty enforced through the 
income tax code. Id. §§ 1501, 10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 242, 909. 
26 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, at 2 & n.5, 5–6 (2006); R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination 
and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1171, 1184 (2006); 
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 353, 
353 (2007); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 
900 (2005). 
27 MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS WEALTH AND WHAT 
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 15, 28–32 (2010); RAKESH KOCHHAR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND 
HISPANICS 1 (2011), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-
Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf. 
28 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1025, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S 
EARNINGS IN 2009, at 2, 4 chart 4, 9–34 tbl.2 (2010); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
REPORT 1026, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2009, at 2, 3 
(2010). 
29 See KOCHHAR ET AL., supra note 27, at 10, 12 (reporting that minorities 
experienced a greater rate of home foreclosures, a greater rate of unemployment, and a 
greater drop in household income than did whites). 
30 Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. Unit A 
July 1981); see also Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) 
(describing at-will employment as allowing termination “for good cause, for no cause 
or even for cause morally wrong”). 
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very few employment actions that are motivated by a few narrow 
categories of status or conduct. One of these prohibitions, of course, is 
the prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis of 
membership in certain protected classes. Employers may not take adverse 
employment actions against employees because of the employees’ race, 
color, national origin, religion, sex,31 age,32 or disability.33 
Choosing to focus on these statuses made sense given this country’s 
history of excluding some people from work and other social goods 
because of their race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, or 
disability. But the statutes enacted to prohibit discrimination framed the 
protected classes in neutral terms, while that history of exclusion was not 
neutral.  
A. Neutral Framing and Formal Equality 
Consider the wording of the antidiscrimination provisions of the Ku 
Klux Klan Acts, the civil rights statutes enacted during Reconstruction: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other.34 
And: 
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property.35 
This language, framed in terms of equalizing others with whites, 
recognized that de jure discrimination had privileged white people and 
had disadvantaged people of other races.36 The language appears to be 
designed to allow the government to take actions that lift up people who 
were not white even if that might foreclose some opportunity for a white 
person. 
 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
32 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
34 Id. § 1981(a). 
35 Id. § 1982. 
36 Not all antidiscrimination law was framed race consciously during this time. 
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were framed without reference to race 
at all, and the Fifteenth Amendment provided that the right to vote may not be 
abridged on the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XV, § 1. 
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Compare the language of the Ku Klux Klan Acts to the language of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
   (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
   (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.37 
Title VII focuses on race as a category rather than on a particular race or 
races, even though the discrimination in this country that led to 
enactment of Title VII was against non-whites—primarily African-
Americans—just like the discrimination targeted by the Ku Klux Klan 
Acts. All races did not suffer equally from the Jim Crow era, but all races 
are protected by the language in Title VII. 
The shift to neutrality made a difference in the operation of the law 
as well. Consider the example of sex discrimination. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, a number of states had enacted sex-specific labor 
legislation that at least purported to improve the lives of women.38 Sex-
specific labor legislation was then struck down by the courts when Title 
VII was enacted, because Title VII required sex neutrality.39 This shift to 
neutrality was accompanied by a strong commitment to formal equality. 
Formal equality is sometimes also called equality of rights or equal 
opportunity. In the law, formal equality usually refers either to the 
absence of classification or to a mandate not to classify on the basis of 
membership in a particular group.40 Formal equality is focused on the 
individual rather than on the group that the individual may be a member 
 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
38 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding a law that limited 
the number of hours per day and per week that women could work against a 
constitutional challenge). The effects of those laws were not necessarily to improve 
women’s lives, since they led to employers tending not to hire women. See BARBARA 
ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND 
THEORY 86–87, 105–06, 111–12 (2d ed. 1996); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S 
WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 11–12, 24, 34–40 (1990); 
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE 
UNITED STATES 191, 195–96, 201 (2003). 
39 E.g., Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
40 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 
108–21 (1976) (using the term antidiscrimination to describe anticlassification or 
formal equality). 
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of.41 Formal equality is nothing more or less than the Aristotelian 
principle that likes should be treated alike while those who are not alike 
should be treated differently.42 
An alternate approach to equality is substantive equality or equality 
of outcomes or results. Substantive equality generally refers to equality in 
the distribution of goods, resources, and power, and is often described as 
embodying an anti-subordination principle.43 This anti-subordination 
principle provides that actions enforcing the inferior status of historically 
oppressed groups should be prohibited.44 
In the years since Title VII was enacted, formal equality has become 
firmly entrenched as the primary equality norm both as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation, and, generally, as a matter of legislative 
policy and statutory interpretation.45 As a result, even so-called benign 
classifications, classifications at least nominally aimed at benefitting social 
groups historically oppressed, have been struck down as violating the 
Constitution.46 Any facial race consciousness, and to a lesser extent, sex 
 
41 See id. at 123, 126–27; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 
1472 (2004). 
42 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. V, at 145, 153, 265–67 
(F.H. Peters trans., C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1881) (those who are equal should receive 
equal shares and those not equal should not); see, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 
27, 31–32 (1885) (adopting this framework). 
43 Siegel, supra note 41, at 1472–73. 
44 Id. 
45 Compare Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681–82, (2009) (Scalia, J., 
concurring), with id. at 2689–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority in Ricci uses 
formal equality principles to hold that consideration of the racial impact of a test was 
race discrimination. Justice Scalia’s concurrence suggests that a statute that requires 
the government to provide substantive equality or equality of results may violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Ginsberg’s dissent puts the city’s actions in the 
context of a long history of race discrimination, promoting the city’s actions as 
necessary for substantive equality. See also Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, 
and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321 (2008) 
(discussing color-blind and color-conscious approaches by the Supreme Court); 
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1473; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal 
Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 946 
(1975) (arguing that the Court should promote political equality and equality of 
opportunity, but refrain from promoting economic equality). 
46 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–08 (1989) (applying 
strict scrutiny to a program that the government asserted was designed to benefit 
racial minorities, and striking the program down on the ground that remedying 
historical societal discrimination was not, by itself, a compelling governmental 
interest); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (striking down 
the exclusion of men from a nursing program argued to be a way to increase 
opportunities for women). Of course, the policies at issue in those cases may not 
actually have benefitted people of color or women, at least in some senses. Even if 
they did, there may have been significant costs imposed as well. The policy barring 
men from the Mississippi University for Women’s nursing program, for example, may 
have served to promote sex segregation in the health services fields, segregation that 
generally results in lower pay for jobs dominated by women. In addition, yet another 
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consciousness, imperils a statute or government action.47 On the other 
hand, laws neutral as to race or sex on their face generally are upheld as 
valid exercises of government power even if the primary effects of such 
laws are to penalize or benefit individuals on the basis of race or sex.48 
This approach to equality has, to at least some extent, frozen 
historical inequities in place. Consider this allegory: 
Two groups—one white, the other black—are playing a game of 
poker. They have been playing the same game for some 400 years, 
during which time the white group has cheated on numerous 
occasions. The white group now announces that “from this day 
forward, we will stop cheating.” “That’s fine,” the black group 
responds, “but what are you going to do about all those poker chips 
that have stacked up on your side of the table all these years.” 
“We’re going to give them to current and future members of our 
 
so-called benign classification was struck down in the Title VII context. UAW v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (striking down a fetal protection policy 
that affected only women as a violation of Title VII). The fetal protection policy at 
issue in Johnson Controls “protected” women who could not prove they were infertile 
from higher paying jobs that exposed them to higher levels of lead, on the ground 
that the exposure ran the risk of injury to fetuses the women might be carrying. The 
policy did not allow men to opt out of those jobs despite the link between male 
exposure to lead and health risks to fetuses fathered. The ban on women serving in 
ground combat positions in the military seems to present a similar kind of “benefit.” 
Women are protected from some kinds of casualties, but their ability to advance 
within the military is limited. Of course, if the reason for the ban is not the danger to 
the women themselves, but instead the danger that male troops would face because 
they would risk more to be chivalrous to protect their sisters-in-arms, then maybe the 
policy would not be considered a “benign” classification. 
47 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that a 
prohibition of disparate impact, or discrimination in outcome, by private parties may 
violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring private parties to discriminate by taking 
race into account); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 747–48 (2007) (plurality opinion) (striking down the use of race to assign grade 
school students to schools and noting that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race”). 
48 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68 
(1977) (holding that only intentional discrimination violates the Equal Protection 
Clause but that such intent can be shown by such factors as disproportionate impact, 
the historical background of the challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, 
departures from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the decision-
makers); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact 
discrimination is not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment). But cf. 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340–41 (1960) (considering redistricting that 
changed the boundaries of a district “from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided 
figure” that excluded all but four or five of the 400 black voters and no white voter as 
evidence of race-based intent); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding 
that a neutral ordinance applied to put only Chinese laundry owners out of business 
demonstrated intent to discriminate on the basis of race). 
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group,” the white group replies. “So, whites will continue to benefit 
from past cheating; that’s not fair,” the black group insists.49 
As this allegory might suggest, this approach to equality views social 
goods as fixed resources, and race, sex, and each other status as a closed 
system. In a closed system with scarce resources, every context is zero-
sum. To give to one is to take away from another. Privilege, in the sense 
of a head start or relative advantage, is invisible, and the distribution of 
resources and social goods appears natural, at least to those who have 
more.50 Not only are real redistributions seen as punitive, but even 
moderate changes in the mechanisms of distribution are seen as 
impinging on “rights” that members of the dominant group have to a 
continued disproportionate share.51 
Not all distributions of social goods like jobs are so explicitly 
motivated by race or sex. Much of the distribution to future members of 
the same group comes through the process of homosocial reproduction. 
Organizational studies demonstrate that leaders or gatekeepers in a 
variety of situations are likely to prefer subordinates who are socially 
similar to themselves.52 This preference is a way that people hedge against 
uncertainty in predicting good job performance or even in pinning down 
what it is that marks good job performance.53 These gatekeepers may or 
may not realize at a fully conscious level that they are taking race, sex, or 
other protected characteristics into account; they are simply choosing 
people who live in the “right” parts of town, belong to the “right” 
organizations, went to the “right” schools, and do the “right” things in 
 
49 ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 3 
(3d ed. 2005). 
50 People tend to attribute their successes to themselves, believing that they 
achieved what they did through their own efforts. See Thomas Shelley Duval & Paul J. 
Silvia, Self-Awareness, Probability of Improvement, and the Self-Serving Bias, 82 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49 (2002); Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving 
Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213, 213 (1975). 
51 See Caron & Repetti, supra note 24, at 156–58 (documenting the way that 
rhetoric has been used in the estate tax debate to gather support against explicitly 
redistributive policies); Ronald Turner, On Palatable, Palliative, and Paralytic Affirmative 
Action, Grutter-Style, in LAW, CULTURE & AFRICANA STUDIES 103, 107–08 (James L. 
Conyers, Jr. ed., 2008) (discussing the role that rhetoric about harm to white 
“innocents” serves in galvanizing opposition to affirmative action). Individuals seem 
to generally favor equality of distributions in the abstract, when not applied to 
themselves, but even when distributional changes are applied to others whom the test 
subjects believe have greater ability or put in greater effort, at least white men, and to 
a lesser extent, white women, value efficiency over equality. Philip A. Michelbach et 
al., Doing Rawls Justice: An Experimental Study of Income Distribution Norms, 47 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 523, 527–31 (2003). 
52 ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 47–48, 54, 68 (1993). 
53 Id. at 54, 61–63. 
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their free time.54 Those people also tend to share the same race, sex, or 
other protected status with the gatekeepers.55 
Distribution of tangible goods and wealth is not always carried out 
through what we would ordinarily think about as discrimination. Much 
wealth, at least, is built intergenerationally, and it is this fact that has led 
to a huge racial wealth gap.56 People tend to transfer whatever wealth 
they have to their descendants, and those descendents are usually of the 
same race because of patterns of reproduction and marriage. Another 
source of wealth is homeownership, and because of racial segregation in 
housing, plus the racially disparate effects of the recent housing crisis, 
black and Latino households have lost much of the wealth they might 
have had even a couple of years ago.57 
The story is a little different for women. Although women can 
inherit wealth to exactly the same extent as male heirs and are currently 
outperforming men in educational achievement and thus have access to 
wealth-building tools,58 women own less than forty percent of what men 
own, in part because of the way work and family care are structured, and 
in part because of what happens to women who never marry men or who 
are no longer married to men.59 
Because it is difficult to link racially and sexually disparate effects to 
some conscious decision to classify people on the basis of race or sex, 
formal equality cannot do much to address them. Complicating this fact 
is that even where there might be a decision in the background that 
someone could point to, proving discrimination is a real challenge. 
B. Narrowness of the Prohibition in an At-Will Background 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, in terms of achieving social 
transformation, formal equality is of very limited utility. Even apart from 
social transformation, however, vindicating the interests of workers in any 
level of job security or fair treatment at work on an individual level 
indicates that prohibiting only a narrow class of decisions is also of 
extremely limited utility. 
When a person is injured by something that happened at work, if the 
person lacks a collective bargaining agreement (which most of us lack), 
 
54 See id. at 61–62. 
55 See id. at 68; Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why 
Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 
1584 (2004) (considering “homosocial reproduction” in corporate boards). 
56 Currently, the median wealth of white households is 20 times that of black 
households and 18 times that of Hispanic households. KOCHHAR ET AL., supra note 27, 
at 1. 
57 Id. at 1–2, 4. 
58 CHANG, supra note 27, at 2. 
59 Id. at 2, 8–10. 
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that person has only a few statutory avenues for relief.60 In order to 
pursue that relief, a person has to fit his or her story into what one of 
those statutes prohibits.61 For the employment discrimination statutes, 
that means first choosing one of the identities protected by Title VII and 
categorizing oneself in that manner. That choice may not be problematic 
for some people, but it may be for others. Requiring a person to adopt a 
racial label—or reducing a person to that label, for example—may 
impose something that person resists, or may be something that does not 
describe that person’s identity well. 
Additionally, the person has to fit what happened to him or her into 
the relatively narrow box of what discrimination because of this status is 
supposed to look like. Even if the person believes that his or her 
protected status was the cause of the employer’s action, an outsider 
viewing that situation might be skeptical, especially if the action itself 
would not be a violation of any laws—and it is only the alleged motive 
that makes it so.62 
The combination of the need to label oneself in a particular way and 
to shoehorn the story into a narrow narrative is likely to translate into a 
significant number of particularly weak-looking charges at the EEOC and 
at least some weak-looking cases filed in court. And the presence of those 
weak-looking cases may taint the stronger cases, either by diluting the 
pool as a whole or by confirming the suspicion that many complaints of 
discrimination are frivolous. 
C. Intent and Problems of Proof and of Implicit Bias as the Mechanism for 
Discrimination 
The prohibition on discrimination is narrow in another way. For 
practical purposes, the only forms of discrimination that are truly 
recognized by courts are intentional discrimination and disparate 
treatment. Although Title VII also prohibits disparate impact, its utility 
seems to be fading, and judges seem to be very reluctant to enforce that 
prohibition.63 Therefore, discriminatory intent is the single thing that 
creates liability. But proving intent—what was actually inside a person’s 
head when that person made the decision at issue—can be very difficult, 
 
60 See Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will 
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 68–70 (2008); Joseph E. Slater, The 
“American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53, 55 (2007). 
61 See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal 
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77–80 (2007) (discussing the 
narrowness of the protection against discrimination on the basis of race). 
62 Id. at 79–82. 
63 E.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–73, 2675–76 (2009) (concluding 
that the doctrine was judicially created, but not really a part of Title VII, and that it 
was adopted much later by Congress only as a secondary goal); see also, e.g., Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548, 2554 (2011) (failing to reach the plaintiff 
class’s claims that subjective decision-making and a sexist corporate culture created a 
disparate impact on women). 
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especially when any reason other than the person’s protected status 
means that no liability results.64 
Intent is problematic not just because of problems of proof, though. 
The very meaning of intent—or when a person’s protected status causes 
the decision-maker to take a particular action—is a bit unsettled.65 
Discrimination is often not a fully self-aware consideration of protected 
status that a person has chosen to make; rather, our decision-making is 
heavily influenced by processes that occur outside of our normal self-
awareness, but which bias our actions in predictable and systematic 
ways.66 
Cognitive psychological research demonstrates that our beliefs and 
experiences filter our perception in fundamental ways, and the way that 
we then perceive matters reinforces our beliefs recursively.67 According to 
these studies, humans naturally classify things in the world in order to 
function. The things in our world are infinitely varied, and we simply 
cannot fully process the impact of each variation we encounter.68 So we 
generalize about things—objects and people alike—based on a few 
encounters with them. We then use those generalizations to define 
categories, and in the future, quickly sort what we encounter into those 
categories without reflection.69 We use the definitions of our categories to 
define the thing we have encountered and to predict how that thing is 
likely to act or be acted upon.70 This sorting function facilitates quick 
judgments, makes the world seem more predictable, and allows us to act. 
Although this process is important to our ability to function, relying 
on categories—essentially creating group identities—has far-reaching 
consequences. When we have assigned an object to a group, we then 
 
64 See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508–09 (1993) (holding 
that plaintiffs needed to prove that their protected class status was the reason for the 
adverse employment action challenged, and that proving the asserted reason to be a 
pretext was not necessarily enough). 
65 See Marcia L. McCormick, Consensus, Dissensus, and Enforcement: Legal Protection 
of Working Women from the Time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire to Today, 14 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 683 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past 
the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 913–25 (2005) (discussing the 
debates over what “discriminate” means). 
66 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995). 
67 See id. at 1202; Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in 1 STUDIES IN CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977) [hereinafter Rosch, Human 
Categorization]; Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND 
CATEGORIZATION 27, 27–28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978) 
[hereinafter Rosch, Principles]. 
68 See Rosch, Human Categorization, supra note 67, at 1–2. 
69 Id. (“Since no organism can cope with infinite diversity, one of the most basic 
functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment into classifications by 
which non-identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent.”); Rosch, Principles, supra 
note 67, at 27–28. 
70 Krieger, supra note 66, at 1188–89. 
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perceive it as more like other things within that group and less like things 
outside of that group.71 This process gets personalized when people are 
given group identities. Even when the distinction is arbitrary, as with 
people randomly assigned to teams, people view members of their own 
group (the “in-group”) as more like them, and others (the “out-group”) 
as more different from them than they would if group identity had not 
been assigned.72 We do not only assign other people to groups or get 
assigned randomly; we also willingly identify ourselves with groups. That 
process has similar important consequences: people who choose to 
identify as part of an in-group are far less likely to identify differences 
between members of the out-group.73 
Groups or categories are created by the “salience” of characteristics.74 
Once a characteristic, such as gender or race, becomes salient, or 
noticeable, to a person, that characteristic defines a group. But what 
becomes salient is neither inevitable nor natural. Individuals define what 
 
71 Id. at 1186 (describing two studies and citing Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, 
Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963) (finding 
that, when lines were grouped, participants judged the comparative length of those 
lines as more similar when they compared lines within the same group and more 
different from each other when they compared a line to one in the other group than 
the same people did when they compared the length of lines not assigned to any 
group); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, J. SOC. ISSUES, Autumn 1969, at 79, 
83–86 (describing the same experiment in more detail); Donald T. Campbell, 
Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 
(1956) (finding that when nonsense syllables were linked to a spot on a spatial 
continuum, participants tended to judge nonsense syllables linked to another spot as 
more different than those that were not)). 
72 Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup 
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 
160, 164–65 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Anne Locksley et 
al., Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup 
Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776–83 (1980); see also 
David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Intergroup Relations, in 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 217 (David L. 
Hamilton ed., 1981). 
73 David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of 
the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 131 (John F. 
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). Numerous studies that support this 
assertion are summarized in Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and Perceived 
Distributions of Social Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup—Outgroup Perception, in 
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 165, 168–73 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. 
Gaertner eds., 1986) (commenting on studies that included things like asking 
members of student groups to rate the similarity of members of their own and other 
groups, asking members of student groups to assess the traits of members of their 
own and different groups even when the students were given identical information 
about the individual people they were being asked about, asking people to assess how 
likely someone in their group would be to fit a stereotype and how likely someone 
outside of their group would, and asking people with a particular opinion to rate the 
similarity of people with the same or a different opinion). 
74 See Krieger, supra note 66, at 1190 (describing how categorical structures are 
triggered). 
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is salient in any given context, often choosing what their culture defines 
as salient.75 In other words, our choices may be constrained or structured 
by the broader society we are a part of, but they are still choices. Because 
choices about salience are within our control, we can control how our 
brains categorize people into groups.76 The operation of choice makes 
the effects of these cognitive shortcuts appropriate for regulation.77 
One such effect is the tendency to stereotype—essentially, to create a 
cognitive shortcut that links personal traits with a salient characteristic in 
order “to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining 
information about people.”78 Once set, these cognitive shortcuts “bias[] 
in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, 
and recall of information about other people,” and they influence 
judgment continuously.79 
These cognitive shortcuts create expectations that transform the way 
we perceive others, remember things about others, and interpret 
 
75 That is not to say that in every instance individuals make a conscious choice 
about which characteristics matter. Conscious adoption is possible, but individuals 
also absorb information about what characteristics matter to others (and therefore 
should matter to them) from exposure to the culture they live in. See HOWARD J. 
EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973); Richard E. Nisbett et al., 
Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 
291 (2001).  
76 Even though some categories become salient because we absorb them, see 
supra note 75 and accompanying text, the lack of fully self-aware adoption does not 
mean that salience and categorizations are outside of our control. They do not 
function entirely automatically and can be confronted and changed by conscious 
effort. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 242–47, 255–56 (2002); Ann C. McGinley, 
¡Viva la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 415, 430–32 (2000); see also JACK MEZIROW, TRANSFORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF 
ADULT LEARNING 186–88 (1991); Jack Mezirow, Transformation Theory of Adult Learning, 
in IN DEFENSE OF THE LIFEWORLD: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT LEARNING 39, 39 
(Michael R. Welton ed., 1995). 
77 See Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2003) (analogizing liability for discrimination 
caused by cognitive bias to the law related to dangerous conditions on land); Michael 
Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1241, 1248 
(1999). But see Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1226, 1228 
(1999) (arguing that there should be no remedy for the kind of discrimination that is 
caused by implicit bias). 
78 Krieger, supra note 66, at 1187–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of 
Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 320–22 (2000). While this 
description of how stereotypes are functioning may sound very benign, stereotypes in 
a society with power imbalances such as ours have operated to perpetuate and even 
aggravate those power imbalances. 
79 Krieger, supra note 66, at 1188. Just as for salience, which defines groupness in 
the first place, we decide what behaviors to attribute to particular groups either 
consciously or through exposure to culture. David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-
Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979). 
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motivations for the actions of others.80 Memory is particularly tricky. We 
tend to remember a person’s actions only if those actions fit our 
stereotypes of that person, we tend to “remember” actions that fit our 
stereotypes even if the person never engaged in those actions, and we 
tend to forget actions that did not fit our stereotypes.81 Additionally, we 
tend to assume that a person who acts consistently with a stereotype acted 
because of innate characteristics—that this person will usually act this way 
because he or she is this type of person—but a person who acts 
inconsistently with a stereotype acted because of transitional or 
situational factors—that this person does not usually act this way because 
he or she is not this type of person.82 For example, if we believe that male 
professionals tend not to have family responsibilities, then we are likely to 
believe that a man who steps out of the office at 2:30 in the afternoon 
must be going to a meeting and not picking up his children from school 
even if he is, in fact, picking his children up from school.83  
And so discrimination occurs through an ongoing process of 
interaction that often happens outside of our normal self-awareness, but 
the impact of these cognitive biases does not stop there. The judgments 
we make about situations that we observe but are not a part of are 
colored in the same way through the same process. Consequently, those 
who interpret and enforce the law are prone to the same kinds of biases 
about people and situations that we all are. To the extent that those who 
interpret and enforce the law tend to belong to majority groups and to 
the extent that some stereotypes of women and people of color are 
pervasive in our culture, they will tend to interpret the claims of women 
and people of color as not constituting any sort of discrimination. Thus, 
decision-makers bring into the decision-making process their own 
worldviews about what discrimination is, what people who claim they 
have been discriminated against are like, and what members of particular 
races, sexes, religions, and national origins are like. These worldviews 
influence the way that decision-makers interact with people and how they 
view the interactions of others. 
 
80 See Krieger, supra note 66, at 1200–09. 
81 Id. at 1207–09 (summarizing research on stereotypes and memory); see also 
Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory, 35 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41–45 (1977). 
82 Krieger, supra note 66, at 1204–07. For example, because women with children 
are presumed to innately make their children, rather than their jobs, their first 
priority, when a woman with children is late to work, her boss is likely to assume that 
her innate characteristic of prioritizing childcare responsibilities was the cause. On 
the other hand, because men are presumed to put work first, a man late for work may 
be assumed to have been caught in traffic, a transitional cause. Joan C. Williams, The 
Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases 
and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433–34 (2003). 
83 This example was given over lunch during Lewis & Clark Law School’s 16th 
Annual Business Law Fall Forum by one of the attendees who related that her 
husband, who was in a top leadership position at his company, nonetheless was 
relieved at the assumption of his coworkers. 
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D. Each Class Is Viewed as Discrete and Insular—The Problems of 
Intersectionality 
The prohibition on discrimination because of protected class status 
is narrow in yet another way. Each status in Title VII is viewed as if it were 
truly separate and capable of scientific identification, and as if people 
only have one. This is not accurate. First, no status is bounded by bright 
lines or as capable of scientific identification as we might think. It is 
surprisingly difficult to identify what “race” or even “sex” mean. There 
are debates about whether “sex” encompasses only the biological 
differences that are true for all or nearly all women, or also differences in 
behavior that are believed to be linked to sex.84 The debate over 
balancing work and family is a great example of this. While women are 
overwhelmingly more likely than men to be responsible within the family 
for caregiving even when they are also wage-earners outside the home, 
penalizing employees because they provide care is not considered sex 
discrimination.85 Another classic example is present in grooming codes 
that regulate behavior along gender lines: having sex-specific rules for 
appearance is generally not considered to be discrimination, even when 
employers classify men and women and prescribe different rules for 
each.86 Finally, there are also debates about whether sexual identity or 
sexual orientation are a part of what sex is or whether they are something 
separable from sex.87 Race is even more clearly socially constructed, 
despite the fact that many people believe that there are biological 
differences among races.88 
 
84 Compare LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN (2006) (arguing that women 
and men have different behavior linked to neurological differences), with CORDELIA 
FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM CREATE 
DIFFERENCE (2010) (pointing out the weaknesses in research linking behavior to 
neurological differences and arguing that researchers’ biases make them construct 
findings to support those differences), and REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: 
THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES (2010) (same). 
85 See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–2, 14–15 (2000); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender 
Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989). 
86 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(upholding a requirement that women wear “full” makeup and men not wear any as not 
discriminatory even though men and women were required to do different things).  
87 See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008); Vickers v. 
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761–65 (6th Cir. 2006); I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual 
Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1159 (1991). 
88 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, 
Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1455, 1459–60 (2002); John Levi Martin & 
King-To Yeung, The Use of the Conceptual Category of Race in American Sociology, 1937–99, 
18 SOC. F. 521, 521–22 (2003); see generally ANN MORNING, THE NATURE OF RACE: HOW 
SCIENTISTS THINK AND TEACH ABOUT HUMAN DIFFERENCE (2011) (exploring different 
conceptions of race held by scientists and students); Ian F. Haney López, The Social 
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-
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Moreover, just as motives that mix protected-status and unprotected-
status reasons may create problems with proving causation,89 so do 
motives that focus on one subgroup of a protected class. If only one 
subgroup is affected by an employer’s decision, there may be no 
discrimination against a member of that subgroup on the basis of the 
larger status. Pregnancy is a classic example of this problem. Even though 
all pregnant individuals are women,90 the class of people who are not 
pregnant is comprised of both men and women. It was this lack of perfect 
symmetry between the classes that led the Supreme Court to hold that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination.91 
Another problem similar to the multiple motives problem occurs 
because every one of us has multiple identities: we each have a race, a 
sex, a religion (or lack of religion), a national origin, and a color. 
Focusing on only one aspect of a person’s multiple identities tends to 
obscure how those multiple identities acting together may have led to 
what happened to them. Intersecting identities, though present in every 
case, can become problematic for those for whom more than one 
identity is actually visible, as when more than one identity is non-majority 
and implicated in the case. For example, if a black woman is fired 
because of stereotypes of black women, she may be found not to have 
suffered any discrimination at all if those stereotypes differ from 
stereotypes of white women or of black men. In such a situation, a 
decision-maker would be likely to find that the woman was not 
discriminated against because of her race, because other members of her 
race (black men) did not suffer from application of the same stereotype. 
That decision-maker would also likely find that she was not discriminated 
against because of her sex, because other members of her sex (white 
women) did not suffer from application of the same stereotype.92 
 
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (considering and rejecting a biological and hereditary 
conception of race). 
89 See Sullivan, supra note 65, at 937 & n.108. 
90 More accurately, only people with at least a functioning uterus, whether they 
identify as male or female, can currently become pregnant. At least three 
transgendered men have borne children. Patrick Califia-Rice, Family Values: Two Dads 
with a Difference—Neither of Us Was Born Male, VILLAGE VOICE (June 20, 2000), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2000-06-20/news/family-values (describing how he and 
his partner Matt Rice had their son); Neil Nagraj, Meet the World’s Second ‘Pregnant 
Man’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-01-
26/news/17943275_1_pregnant-man-paper-reports-scott-moore (describing the 
pregnancy of Scott Moore); Guy Trebay, He’s Pregnant. You’re Speechless., N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 2008, § 9 (Sunday Styles), at 1 (discussing the pregnancy of Thomas Beatie). 
91 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976), superseded by statute, 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)) (holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy 
was not discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII even though only women 
were affected); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–96 (1974) (holding that 
pregnancy and sex were analytically distinct under the Equal Protection Clause). 
92 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
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These problems with the protected class approach to employment 
discrimination seem intractable. We have been using this approach for 
the better part of the last 50 or 60 years, and while our society has made 
significant gains, we seem not to have moved significantly forward for the 
last 20 or 30 years. It is time to consider something new. 
IV. SOCIAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS THAT CAN BE DECOUPLED 
FROM THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
At the most fundamental level, physical security for individuals is 
provided mostly by work.93 At one time, many people grew or raised their 
own food and traded for the things they could not produce. With the 
Industrial Revolution, that changed, and people began working for wages 
in increasing numbers. Over time, the percentage of the population in 
the workforce has continued to rise, and the primary source of support 
for most households in the United States is the work of one or more 
members of those households.94 
Today about 64% of those eligible to work in the United States do 
work.95 That figure is the lowest that it has been in a decade, largely due 
to the recent recession.96 And despite this, many of those working have 
great difficulty purchasing the things necessary for physical security like 
food and shelter.97 Even more are able to provide those things, but have 
 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 150. For more on how a focus on women’s rights has 
disproportionately benefitted upper and middle class white women, see for example, 
ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, NO TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND THE FUTURE OF 
WOMEN ch. 4 (2002), Christine Stansell, White Feminists and Black Realities: The Politics 
of Authenticity, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 251, 253 (Toni Morrison ed., 
1992), and Julianne Malveaux, Comparable Worth and Its Impact on Black Women, REV. 
BLACK POL. ECON., Dec. 1985, at 47, 48 (1985). 
93 Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 
82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 532 (1997). 
94 See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR, at xiv-xvii (1995) (describing the shift to 
wage dependence); Karst, supra note 93, at 532. 
95 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000 (data extracted Sept. 15, 
2011, 4:32 PM) (showing labor force statistics from the Current Population Survey 
from 2001 to 2011). 
96 Id. Interestingly, although the recession ended in 2009, with the participation 
rate a full percentage point lower than at the beginning of the recession, participation 
fell just over another full percentage point from January 2010 until mid-year, 2011. 
97 “In 2009 . . . about 43.6 million people, or 14.3 percent of the Nation’s 
population, lived at or below the official poverty level,” and 10.4 million of those 
worked. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1027, A PROFILE OF THE WORKING 
POOR, 2009, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswp2009.pdf; see 
generally DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA (2004) 
(documenting the lives of those who live at or close to the poverty line despite 
working). 
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so little saved that any disruption in work or unforeseen expense can be 
catastrophic.98 
Work is the primary way in which we ensure people have food, 
shelter, and clothing, but much of our safety net comes from programs 
that provide wage insurance or savings to substitute for wages. These 
programs include unemployment insurance, most obviously, but also 
disability insurance, workers’ compensation, social security, and pensions 
and other retirement savings. The only social benefit that is not as clearly 
linked to wage insurance is health insurance. 
The social policies that can most easily be separated from the 
employment relationship are the ones that already are, at least in part: 
health care and old-age or work-related long-term disability support. The 
policies that would be more difficult to separate are the subsistence kinds 
of benefits. While philosophers and economists have proposed a basic 
income for everyone, that idea has not taken root in the United States.99 
As explained before, health care was linked to the employment 
relationship in the first place, at least in part, because doing so was a way 
to provide compensation to employees otherwise barred by the price 
controls that limited wages during World War II. Those benefits became 
popular and were demanded by organized labor. Then, to compete for 
workers, even workplaces that were not organized began to offer health 
benefits.100  
There was additional logic to the link as well. By and large, we 
distribute health care in this country by having individuals purchase 
services from doctors and hospitals. We then secure the ability of people 
to purchase those services by having them buy insurance.101 Health 
insurance spreads the costs of purchasing health care among a group of 
people with the idea that most of them at any given time will not need to 
draw on the funds.102 Thus, to work well, the pool of those paying in and 
bearing the risk has to have a low overall risk of needing to draw on the 
funds. So the pool has to be big enough and diverse enough to 
 
98 In the first quarter of 2011, 28% of consumers in North America reported that 
they had no discretionary income. NIELSEN, GLOBAL ONLINE CONSUMER CONFIDENCE, 
CONCERNS AND SPENDING INTENTIONS 7 (2011). A few years ago, the Nielsen Consumer 
Confidence Survey found that only about 63% of consumers had little or no savings or 
investments. See NIELSEN, CONSUMER CONFIDENCE, CONCERNS AND SPENDING  
INTENTIONS 5 (2008), available at http://pl.nielsen.com/trends/documents/ 
GlobalReportConsumerConfidence2ndhalf07b.pdf. 
99 See GIJS VAN DONSELAAR, THE RIGHT TO EXPLOIT: PARASITISM, SCARCITY, BASIC 
INCOME 102–03 (2009); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF 
ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM?, at 1–2 (1995); DANIEL RAVENTÓS, BASIC INCOME: 
THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 8 (Julie Wark trans., 2007). 
100 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
101 See M. Kate Bundorf & Mark V. Pauly, United States, in THE WORLD BANK, 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE FOR PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: STRENGTH IN NUMBERS 253 
(Alexander S. Preker et al. eds., 2010). 
102 Id. at 253, 259. 
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accomplish this. The employees of large employers formed relatively 
good risk pools because they tended to be big enough and diverse 
enough to spread the risk—or spread the cost—well. So providing 
insurance through employment made sense from an insurance 
perspective as well.103 
The link between old-age support and employment has a similar 
history. Pensions were a way to provide compensation not otherwise 
possible; they were popular, demanded by unions, and were then 
demanded more broadly.104 They provided a means of support when a 
person was no longer able to work because of infirmity associated with 
aging. Pensions also had another function for employers, though. They 
provided longevity and loyalty to the employer and were something of a 
reward for a lifetime of service. The availability of pensions reduced 
turnover, but also encouraged older workers to leave the workplace, 
making room to bring in younger workers. The timing of those exits 
became more predictable and thus more manageable.105 
Support for those who could once support themselves through work 
but become unable to do so because of injury or disease is a bit more 
complicated. Social Security was expanded in the 1950s to include 
insurance for those who became disabled.106 Many employers provide 
private insurance benefits as well, but not on as wide a scale as health 
benefits.107 
Although there has been logic in the connection, there is no 
necessary link between work and health care or work and old-age 
support. More closely connected with work are those programs that were 
designed to deal with income insecurity because of disruptions in work: 
workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance benefits, for 
example.  
V. CONCLUSION: ON DECOUPLING 
The point of this Article is not to argue for some sort of socialist or 
Marxist utopian collective—from each according to his ability to each 
according to his need—but to simply argue that we should stop using the 
employment relationship to shoulder so much of the social justice 
burden. From the employee’s perspective, it is easy to see why getting a 
job and keeping that job is so important. The job is the key to some 
minimal level of physical and financial security. It is the pathway to 
health care and to old-age or disability benefits. 
 
103 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 6, at 31. 
104 See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 7 (2004). 
105 Id. at 3–10. 
106 See Edward D. Berkowitz & Wendy Wolff, Disability Insurance and the Limits of 
American History, PUB. HISTORIAN, Spring 1986, at 65, 68. 
107 See Life and Disability Insurance Benefits, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
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Especially in labor markets with a large supply of labor, employees 
have powerful motives to make sure that they do not give employers a 
reason not to hire them or to discharge them once they are hired. 
Employees subject to discrimination may not be able to afford to exercise 
the one right they have under the at-will rule: to leave. And it is the 
power of employees to leave a discriminatory environment that may give 
employers an incentive to curb that discriminatory behavior. Several 
scholars have argued that to the extent that discrimination is irrational, 
the market should correct discrimination by itself.108 If there is any hope 
of the markets working this way, employees have to be able to exercise 
the one power they have: the power to quit. 
Employees lack the practical power to quit because of the economic 
dependence they have on an employer and the vulnerability they face as 
a result of potential retaliation by their employer or potential future 
employers if they allege that they have experienced discrimination.109 
This threat of retaliation affects the functioning of any market correction 
for discrimination by suppressing accurate information about employers, 
as well. 
There are informational asymmetries on both sides of the 
employment relationship. The prospective employee may not have access 
to sufficient information on how an employer treats employees. Likewise, 
employers may not have access to sufficient information on how well a 
particular person will perform a job or fit into the workplace. These 
asymmetries have different effects, but both are important. On the 
employee side, the asymmetry prevents the market from eradicating 
discrimination. If employees cannot talk about conditions at work, or 
cannot talk about why they left, employees that take their places will not 
know what the workplace is actually like. If they had access to this 
information, new employees might decline to work for the employer, 
shrinking the available labor pool, or they might demand higher wages to 
put up with the environment—either one of which would drive up costs 
to the employer. And as long as employees cannot talk about conditions 
at work out of fear of retaliation, the asymmetries on the employee side 
will remain.  
The informational asymmetries that the employer experiences 
interfere with the eradication of discrimination in a very different way. 
Informational asymmetries create an environment of risk in hiring and in 
dealing with employees. That risk is heightened by the administrative and 
financial burden that comes with employing someone. Risk exacerbates 
 
108 Jacob E. Gersen, Markets and Discrimination, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 696–714 
(2007) (outlining the law and economics analyses of the extent of employment 
discrimination and the potential forces driving it). 
109 See Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal 
Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 
211–12 (2009) (summarizing arguments about employee vulnerability to retaliation). 
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the likelihood that decisions will be influenced by implicit biases.110 
Without some way to give employers an incentive to examine their 
implicit biases, the employment relationship is likely to remain mired in 
their operation. If there were less at stake in the employment 
relationship, however, perhaps implicit biases would be less likely to 
operate. Moreover, with less at stake in the employment relationship, less 
would be at stake in any threatened litigation arising out of the 
employment relationship. Perhaps that, too, would make it less risky for 
managers to examine their thought processes to avoid implicit biases. 
Giving people a real voice is not only important to make real their 
ability to exit the employment relationship; it is also a good in its own 
right. People want to be heard. Those who feel wronged want a voice, to 
tell their story in such a way that someone has to listen. Story-telling may 
be part of the process of getting past the injury, of moving on. Or it may 
be a way of warning others who might come after about dangers they may 
face. Putting words to the pain may help contain it, to separate the pain 
or the injury from oneself, as a first step to letting it go. Telling that story 
and having it validated externally are thus important for the employees 
who feel aggrieved.  
Getting the story out is also important for the rest of us. We have an 
interest in knowing what happens behind the closed doors of many 
workplaces. We have interests as consumers or potential business 
partners in knowing what kinds of conduct we are supporting through 
our support or partnership. We have an interest as potential employees, 
too, in knowing what kind of environment we would be signing up for. 
And at the broadest social level, we have an interest in learning what 
conduct employers are engaging in and what makes workers feel they 
have been injured in order to know how to regulate that employment 
relationship. 
Thus, the ability of workers to tell their stories is important for them 
and important for us. The potential for the story to be told is also 
important for employers. For companies with more than a few employees 
and multiple layers of supervision, it is easy for the owner or top level of 
management not to know what conduct lower-level supervisors and 
employees might be engaging in. This interferes with production of the 
product or delivery of the service the employer provides. Moreover, if a 
supervisor or lower-level employee knows that other people will find out 
what happened, that person will think twice about engaging in bad 
conduct in the first place. Sunshine is the best disinfectant, as they say. 
Yet telling a story with a villain and a victim, which is what a story 
about an injury often is, is dangerous to the victim in two ways. First, 
making that story public invites retaliation by the villain or allies of that 
villain, who likely have an interest in the story being kept secret. Second, 
 
110 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
969, 973–75 (2006) (describing how people make hard decisions through the use of 
easier heuristics). 
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portraying oneself as a victim, at least of some kinds of injuries, can cause 
those not allied with the villain to punish the victim. For example, people 
who claim they have been discriminated against are viewed negatively by 
others even when those other people know that the claim is true and that 
the person was actually discriminated against.  
By removing pieces of our social safety net from the employment 
relationship, we would make it easier for employees to leave, easier for 
them to tell their stories, and would make them less likely to litigate what 
happened to them. We also might make it easier for employers to take 
risks in hiring or retaining employees they have concerns about, and 
create less of a disincentive for managers to explore their thought 
processes more closely. In the end, that is good for all of us. 
 
